• DocumentCode
    2088193
  • Title

    LOMAC: Low Water-Mark integrity protection for COTS environments

  • Author

    Fraser, Timothy

  • Author_Institution
    NAI Labs., Glenwood, MD, USA
  • fYear
    2000
  • fDate
    2000
  • Firstpage
    230
  • Lastpage
    245
  • Abstract
    We hypothesize that a form of kernel-resident access control based integrity protection can gain widespread acceptance in commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) environments, provided that it couples some useful protection with a high degree of compatibility with existing software, configurations, and practices. To test this hypothesis, we have developed a highly compatible free open-source prototype called LOMAC, and released it on the Internet. LOMAC is a dynamically loadable extension for COTS Linux kernels that provides integrity protection based on Low Water-Mark access control. We present a classification of existing access control models with regard to compatibility, concluding that models similar to Low Water-Mark are especially well suited to high-compatibility solutions. We also describe our practical strategies for dealing with the pathological cases in the Low Water-Mark model´s behavior which include a small extension of the model, and an unusual application of its concepts
  • Keywords
    Internet; Unix; authorisation; data integrity; operating system kernels; public domain software; software packages; COTS Linux kernels; COTS environments; Internet; LOMAC; Low Water-Mark access control; Low Water-Mark integrity protection; access control models; commercial off-the-shelf environments; dynamically loadable extension; high-compatibility solutions; highly compatible free open-source prototype; kernel-resident access control based integrity protection; pathological cases; Access control; Internet; Kernel; Linux; Open source software; Pathology; Protection; Prototypes; Software prototyping; Testing;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Security and Privacy, 2000. S&P 2000. Proceedings. 2000 IEEE Symposium on
  • Conference_Location
    Berkeley, CA
  • ISSN
    1081-6011
  • Print_ISBN
    0-7695-0665-8
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848460
  • Filename
    848460