DocumentCode
2088703
Title
Notice of Retraction
On the Comparison of the Auctioneer´s Private Information and Common Knowledge
Author
Shenghua Liu
Author_Institution
Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Wuhan Univ., Wuhan, China
fYear
2009
fDate
20-22 Sept. 2009
Firstpage
1
Lastpage
5
Abstract
Notice of Retraction
After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE\´s Publication Principles.
We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.
The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.
With the background of the mechanism design of the present e-Auction and of multi-object auction, the paper offers such a design of a special sequential second-price sealed-bid auction of 2 differentiated objects, which is steadily transferring the auctioneers\´ private information into common knowledge step by step.,analyzing and comparing the bidders\´ preferred bidding and the auctioneers\´ expectant revenue, focuses on the problem of "whether the auctioneer\´s private information is the same as that bidder\´s which is beneficial to its owners, and then draws the funny conclusion concerned such as the design of auction mechanism or the choice of information strategies, and then puts forward the related suggestions as well.
After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE\´s Publication Principles.
We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.
The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.
With the background of the mechanism design of the present e-Auction and of multi-object auction, the paper offers such a design of a special sequential second-price sealed-bid auction of 2 differentiated objects, which is steadily transferring the auctioneers\´ private information into common knowledge step by step.,analyzing and comparing the bidders\´ preferred bidding and the auctioneers\´ expectant revenue, focuses on the problem of "whether the auctioneer\´s private information is the same as that bidder\´s which is beneficial to its owners, and then draws the funny conclusion concerned such as the design of auction mechanism or the choice of information strategies, and then puts forward the related suggestions as well.
Keywords
commerce; computational complexity; auction mechanism design; auctioneer common knowledge; auctioneer private information; e-auction; multi-object auction; second-price sealed-bid auction; Bonding; Cost accounting; Forward contracts; Government; Knowledge management; Power generation economics; Publishing; Resource management; Signal design; Solid modeling;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Management and Service Science, 2009. MASS '09. International Conference on
Conference_Location
Wuhan
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-4638-4
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICMSS.2009.5301614
Filename
5301614
Link To Document