DocumentCode
2102965
Title
Game Analysis on Enterprise Decision of Entry into Patent Pool
Author
Lan Xiangchun ; Wei Zhongcheng
Author_Institution
Wuhan Electr. Power Tech. Coll., Wuhan, China
fYear
2009
fDate
20-22 Sept. 2009
Firstpage
1
Lastpage
4
Abstract
This paper has probed into the simulative function of patent pool on enterprise innovation and analyzed the game model of enterprise decision during the establishment of patent pool. As shown from the result, patent pool is able to promote the enterprise innovation and the decision selection according to the profit maximization principle. Therefore, entry into patent pool is an optimal choice for innovative enterprises.
Keywords
decision making; game theory; innovation management; patents; profitability; enterprise decision selection; enterprise innovation; game model analysis; patent pool simulative function; profit maximization principle; Aggregates; Analytical models; Costs; Educational institutions; Exponential distribution; Investments; Law; Legal factors; Permission; Technological innovation;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Management and Service Science, 2009. MASS '09. International Conference on
Conference_Location
Wuhan
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-4638-4
Electronic_ISBN
978-1-4244-4639-1
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICMSS.2009.5302156
Filename
5302156
Link To Document