Title :
Game Analysis on Enterprise Decision of Entry into Patent Pool
Author :
Lan Xiangchun ; Wei Zhongcheng
Author_Institution :
Wuhan Electr. Power Tech. Coll., Wuhan, China
Abstract :
This paper has probed into the simulative function of patent pool on enterprise innovation and analyzed the game model of enterprise decision during the establishment of patent pool. As shown from the result, patent pool is able to promote the enterprise innovation and the decision selection according to the profit maximization principle. Therefore, entry into patent pool is an optimal choice for innovative enterprises.
Keywords :
decision making; game theory; innovation management; patents; profitability; enterprise decision selection; enterprise innovation; game model analysis; patent pool simulative function; profit maximization principle; Aggregates; Analytical models; Costs; Educational institutions; Exponential distribution; Investments; Law; Legal factors; Permission; Technological innovation;
Conference_Titel :
Management and Service Science, 2009. MASS '09. International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Wuhan
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-4638-4
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-4639-1
DOI :
10.1109/ICMSS.2009.5302156
