DocumentCode
2109870
Title
No More Damaging Ads on Your Own Webpage -- Strategy Proof Mechanisms for Ad Placement
Author
David, E. ; Azulay, R.
Author_Institution
Ashkelon Acad. Coll., Ashkelon, Israel
Volume
2
fYear
2012
fDate
4-7 Dec. 2012
Firstpage
140
Lastpage
145
Abstract
Recently we have been witnessing the phenomena of private Web site owners who are willing to dedicate space on their site for advertisements managed by leading Web companies (e.g., Google, Yahoo). In most cases the choice of the advertisements displayed on a certain site is made without taking into account the preferences of the Web site. In this paper, we focus on the design of mechanisms that are beneficial for both the Web site owner, by allowing placement of highly desired ads, and the advertisers, by introducing a dispensation scheme to reduce the prices paid for highly relevant ads. In this paper, we analyze the case of multi-slots offered by a certain Web site, and we offer three strategy-proof mechanisms that differ in their ranking function, allocation rules, and payment schemes. The performance of all the mechanisms are compared and discussed.
Keywords
Web sites; advertising; pricing; Google; Web companies; Web site preference; Webpage; Yahoo; ad placement; advertisement choice; advertisements; advertisers; allocation rules; dispensation scheme; payment scheme; price reduction; private Web site owner; ranking function; strategy proof mechanism; strategy-proof mechanism; allocation rules; auctions; truthful mechanisms;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology (WI-IAT), 2012 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conferences on
Conference_Location
Macau
Print_ISBN
978-1-4673-6057-9
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/WI-IAT.2012.147
Filename
6511563
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