• DocumentCode
    2109870
  • Title

    No More Damaging Ads on Your Own Webpage -- Strategy Proof Mechanisms for Ad Placement

  • Author

    David, E. ; Azulay, R.

  • Author_Institution
    Ashkelon Acad. Coll., Ashkelon, Israel
  • Volume
    2
  • fYear
    2012
  • fDate
    4-7 Dec. 2012
  • Firstpage
    140
  • Lastpage
    145
  • Abstract
    Recently we have been witnessing the phenomena of private Web site owners who are willing to dedicate space on their site for advertisements managed by leading Web companies (e.g., Google, Yahoo). In most cases the choice of the advertisements displayed on a certain site is made without taking into account the preferences of the Web site. In this paper, we focus on the design of mechanisms that are beneficial for both the Web site owner, by allowing placement of highly desired ads, and the advertisers, by introducing a dispensation scheme to reduce the prices paid for highly relevant ads. In this paper, we analyze the case of multi-slots offered by a certain Web site, and we offer three strategy-proof mechanisms that differ in their ranking function, allocation rules, and payment schemes. The performance of all the mechanisms are compared and discussed.
  • Keywords
    Web sites; advertising; pricing; Google; Web companies; Web site preference; Webpage; Yahoo; ad placement; advertisement choice; advertisements; advertisers; allocation rules; dispensation scheme; payment scheme; price reduction; private Web site owner; ranking function; strategy proof mechanism; strategy-proof mechanism; allocation rules; auctions; truthful mechanisms;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology (WI-IAT), 2012 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conferences on
  • Conference_Location
    Macau
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4673-6057-9
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/WI-IAT.2012.147
  • Filename
    6511563