Virtual bidder group auction mechanism for dynamic spectrum access

In order to fully utilize spectrum, auction-based dynamic spectrum access has become a promising approach which allows unlicensed wireless users to lease unused bands from spectrum license holders. Traditionally, the property of spectrum goes to a unique winner with the highest bid after the auction, and the bidders with low bids would be probably not served. This also may result in spectrum resource wasting when the assigned band is larger than the original request. In fact, because the spectrum is divisible goods, it can be shared among a group of users. In this paper, we propose a novel virtual bidder group (VBG) mechanism in spectrum auction which allows multiple winners to obtain the spectrum item simultaneously. Furthermore, a heuristic phase-optimization algorithm is proposed to reduce the crucial exponential computing time issue of band allocation optimization in double-side bandwidth auction scenario with multiple auctioneers. Simulation results prove that the VBG scheme could significantly improve the realized system data rate and the bandwidth utility, which indicates higher revenue for the spectrum license holder; meanwhile, the proposed phase-optimization algorithm exhibits relative low complexity and could provide a near-optimal performance.