Information disclosing and cooperation in public goods game with punishment

The results of a number of laboratory experiments indicate that costly punishment can uphold cooperation in public goods game. However, studies also suggest that high cooperation does not necessarily imply high earning in experiments with punishment. In this paper, we investigate the impacts of information disclosing on cooperation and then welfare when punishment is available. We report an experiment in which different kinds of information disclosing mechanisms are introduced into the standard public goods game. In one treatment, players´ identities are revealed along with their historical contribution information to allow them to built up a system of reputation, while in another treatment, players´ historical decisions on both contribution and punishment are revealed along with their identities to permit them an opportunity to revenge. Results show that, contributions and overall earnings are marginally significantly improved when only identities is revealed with their contribution information. However, the results change to significant when both information on contribution and punishment as well as players´ identities are available. These results imply that information disclosing helps to promote cooperation and thus wealfare.