Joint demand and supply auction pricing strategy in dynamic spectrum sharing

Conclusion drawn from field measurement is that the allocation of radio spectrum to operators in a static manner does not make efficient use of the scarce spectrum resources. Dynamically allocating radio spectrum based on the demands using auction is one possible approach to improve spectrum utilization efficiency. In this paper, we consider a spectrum auction game, each spectrum supplier (SS) is competing against other suppliers so as to sell as much quantity as possible to maximize its own profit. On the other hand, bandwidth bidders (BBs) are also competing against each other to get the amount of demand spectrum at a lower price. In general, understanding the supply and demand relationship decides the selling price. We propose an auction game which jointly taking in consideration the competition among SSs and BBs, where the bid for the secondary reused spectrum takes place. Given that each SS knows the bandwidth available for secondary reuse over a period of time, with the assistance of a spectrum broker, our approach uses the open bid auction theory to decide the equilibrium point. Towards the end of the bidding process, suppliers and bidders will settle at an equilibrium point, whereby the selling quantities and bidding price are obtained. Our scheme can achieve a rather stable price per bandwidth when total demands do not exceed the total supply.