Study on Incentive Mechanism of Knowledge Employees Based on Human Capital Property Rights

This paper analyzes characteristics of human capital property rights (HCPR) of knowledge employees. Using the framework of multi-task principle-agent, we establish the principle-agent model which involves the tasks of hard studying & hard working and the incentive of performance & property rights, then discuss the interaction between performance incentive and property rights incentive, and analyze the effort of hard studying and hard working. The results show that the property rights incentive may promote employees´ efforts to work hard and study hard, also optimize the performance incentive mechanism. Knowledge employees have the optimal efficiency if they keep all the surplus value. However the property rights incentive has to match the performance incentive, the stronger property rights incentive, the better. When property rights incentive is taken as a long-term incentive, the employees are willing to study hard. When performance incentive is taken as a short-term incentive, they are apt to work hard. When they are lack of property rights incentive, knowledge employees will not be interest in studying or be inclined to external studying behavior.