• DocumentCode
    2141514
  • Title

    A proof of secrecy for a network security model

  • Author

    MacEwen, Glenn ; Glasgow, Janice

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Comput. & Inf. Sci., Queen´´s Univ., Kingston, Ont., Canada
  • fYear
    1991
  • fDate
    18-20 Jun 1991
  • Firstpage
    176
  • Lastpage
    181
  • Abstract
    The network security model originally developed for the SNet secure system is generally applicable to all secure networks. Although it was recognized that allowing message loss in the model permits a covert channel, this operational model was accepted on an intuitive basis as enforcing some concept of secrecy. The paper presents a formal argument that the model, augmented with a no-loss requirement, does indeed satisfy a formal abstract secrecy policy. This secrecy policy, called INF, has previously been defined in terms of security logic. The proof contains two steps. First, the network model augmented with a no-loss requirement (and called NM) is shown to satisfy the non-deducibility (ND) condition. ND satisfies INF, therefore, NM satisfies INF
  • Keywords
    network operating systems; security of data; INF; NM; SNet secure system; covert channel; formal abstract secrecy policy; message loss; network security model; no-loss requirement; nondeducibility; operational model; proof of secrecy; security logic; Circuits; Communication system security; Computer networks; Information science; Information security; Logic; Neodymium; Protocols; Sociotechnical systems; Switches;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Computer Security Foundations Workshop IV, 1991. Proceedings
  • Conference_Location
    Franconia, NH
  • Print_ISBN
    0-8186-2215-6
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/CSFW.1991.151583
  • Filename
    151583