DocumentCode
2141514
Title
A proof of secrecy for a network security model
Author
MacEwen, Glenn ; Glasgow, Janice
Author_Institution
Dept. of Comput. & Inf. Sci., Queen´´s Univ., Kingston, Ont., Canada
fYear
1991
fDate
18-20 Jun 1991
Firstpage
176
Lastpage
181
Abstract
The network security model originally developed for the SNet secure system is generally applicable to all secure networks. Although it was recognized that allowing message loss in the model permits a covert channel, this operational model was accepted on an intuitive basis as enforcing some concept of secrecy. The paper presents a formal argument that the model, augmented with a no-loss requirement, does indeed satisfy a formal abstract secrecy policy. This secrecy policy, called INF, has previously been defined in terms of security logic. The proof contains two steps. First, the network model augmented with a no-loss requirement (and called NM) is shown to satisfy the non-deducibility (ND) condition. ND satisfies INF, therefore, NM satisfies INF
Keywords
network operating systems; security of data; INF; NM; SNet secure system; covert channel; formal abstract secrecy policy; message loss; network security model; no-loss requirement; nondeducibility; operational model; proof of secrecy; security logic; Circuits; Communication system security; Computer networks; Information science; Information security; Logic; Neodymium; Protocols; Sociotechnical systems; Switches;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Computer Security Foundations Workshop IV, 1991. Proceedings
Conference_Location
Franconia, NH
Print_ISBN
0-8186-2215-6
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/CSFW.1991.151583
Filename
151583
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