Study on the Long Effective Mechanism of Construction Safety Supervision Management

Author

Kongguo Zhu ; Shuquan Li

Author_Institution

Sch. of Bus., Tianjin Univ. of Finance & Econ., Tianjin

fYear

2008

fDate

30-31 Dec. 2008

Firstpage

455

Lastpage

458

Abstract

In the paper, the game model between governmental construction safety supervision entities and contractors was established based on game theory. The difference of equilibrium point between general condition and the condition under voluntary accident report system has been discussed. The behaviors of governmental construction safety supervision entities and contractors have been analyzed. The paper discusses how to establish the effective supervision and incentive mechanism for construction projects safety management. It offered a new framework for construction safety supervision management.

Keywords

accident prevention; construction industry; game theory; government policies; construction projects safety management; construction safety supervision management; contractors; game model; game theory; governmental construction safety supervision entity; incentive mechanism; voluntary accident report system; Accidents; Conference management; Costs; Finance; Financial management; Game theory; Information technology; Product safety; Project management; Technology management; Construction Safety Management; Game Theory; Incentive Machanism; Long Effective Mechanism; Supervision Management; Voluntary Accident Report System;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

MultiMedia and Information Technology, 2008. MMIT '08. International Conference on

Conference_Location

Three Gorges

Print_ISBN

978-0-7695-3556-2

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/MMIT.2008.63

Filename

5089158