• DocumentCode
    2159826
  • Title

    The Services Pricing Strategy on Software as a Service

  • Author

    Xiong, Huanhuan ; Peigang Wang ; Zhu, Guobin

  • Author_Institution
    State Key Lab. of Inf. Eng. in Surveying, Mapping & Remote Sensing, Wuhan Univ., Wuhan, China
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    24-26 Aug. 2010
  • Firstpage
    1
  • Lastpage
    5
  • Abstract
    The pricing of "pay-per-use", which is usually viewed as the application of Differential Pricing in Software As A Service(SAAS) become more popular in IT society. Differential Pricing has greatly promoted the development of software industry, but it could not reflect the substantive relationship in terms of the services price, cost and quality. In this paper, we apply bargaining theories, static games of complete information and dynamic games of complete information to analyze the pricing behavior of the oligarchic software enterprises. We use the value of services quality to measure the longitudinal differentiation degree, and study the pricing strategy based on the fluctuant market of homogeneous or heterogeneous consumers with static games. Finally we discuss the dynamic games between the enterprise with cost advantages and with cost disadvantages, and get the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The conclusion indicates that the pricing strategy could normalize the price mechanism of SAAS and promote the development of SAAS fairly and effectively.
  • Keywords
    game theory; oligopoly; pricing; quality of service; software engineering; Nash equilibrium; SAAS; bargaining theories; differential pricing; dynamic games; longitudinal differentiation degree; oligarchic software enterprises; quality of services; software as a service; software development industry; static games; Games; Monopoly; Nash equilibrium; Pricing; Production; Software;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Management and Service Science (MASS), 2010 International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Wuhan
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-5325-2
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-1-4244-5326-9
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICMSS.2010.5576650
  • Filename
    5576650