DocumentCode :
2161818
Title :
Analysis of government information security outsourcing based on principal—Agent theory
Author :
Yue-hong, Wu ; Wei, Zhou
Author_Institution :
Anhui Polytechnic University, Wuhu, China
fYear :
2010
fDate :
4-6 Dec. 2010
Firstpage :
5655
Lastpage :
5658
Abstract :
Based on principal — agent theory, this paper establishes the principal — agent model of government information security outsourcing that has uncertainties but can be supervised and the principal—agent model that has uncertainties but can not be supervised. It analyses the risks and benefits, the participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint in the principal—agent process. The paying incentive mode, the cost incentive mode and the trust incentive mode are devised in this paper.
Keywords :
Companies; Game theory; Government; Information security; Outsourcing; Uncertainty; information security; outsourcing; principal — agent theory;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Information Science and Engineering (ICISE), 2010 2nd International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Hangzhou, China
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-7616-9
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/ICISE.2010.5691776
Filename :
5691776
Link To Document :
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