Entrapping adversaries for source protection in sensor networks

Sensor networks are used in a variety of application areas for diverse problems from habitat monitoring to military tracking. Whenever they are used to monitor sensitive objects, the privacy of monitored objects\´ locations becomes an important concern. When a sensor reports a monitored object by sending a series of messages through the sensor network, the route these messages take in theory creates a trail leading back to their source. By eavesdropping on communications, an attacker may be able to move from node to node to follow this trail. Several approaches aimed at discouraging this kind of eavesdropping have been proposed, including mechanisms for constructing "phantom" routes and approaches that insert fake sources as background noise. A problem with existing approaches is that message latencies become larger and energy costs become higher as a result of introducing protections for the privacy of a source location. This paper proposes a new cyclic entrapment method (CEM) that protects source locations in sensor networks while adding a comparatively low cost in terms of additional message latency and energy