Notice of RetractionInsider Control and the Interest Flow in the Transfer of Control Rights - Case Study on the M&A of Goldman Sachs over Shuanghui

Notice of Retraction

After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.

We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.

The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.

This thesis based on the case of the M&A of Goldman Sachs over Shuanghui, studies the interest flow in the transfer of control right, and explains the motivations of it. It is found that once the state holding company is controlled by the insiders, the transfer of its control rights cannot achieve the purpose of value creation and shareholder return increase, instead causes damages to the benefit of minority shareholders, and even causes the shift of wealth from the original shareholders to the insider and the new shareholders. Therefore, we must limit the opportunism behavior of insiders, and establish the mechanism to protect the state asset and the benefit of minority investors.