Title :
Game Analysis of Knowledge Spillover in Industrial Cluster
Author :
Luo, Yanling ; Ma, Feicheng
Author_Institution :
Center for the Studies of Inf. Resources, Wuhan Univ., Wuhan, China
Abstract :
To provide a tool for analyzing the innovation cooperation of knowledge spillover among clustered enterprises this article proposes a game modeling approach basis on the game theory. This article firstly establishes an improved prisoner´s dilemma game model to discuss the possibility of the cooperation in one-off gaming. Then, this article extends this model to infinitely repeated game model. The resulting model is used to further probe into the possibility of the cooperation in infinitely repeated gaming. The result shows that the innovation cooperation of knowledge spillover among the clustered enterprises is possible and necessary. This article also puts forward the incentive mechanism for fulfilling the cooperation.
Keywords :
game theory; industrial economics; game analysis; game modeling approach; game theory; improved prisoner dilemma game model; incentive mechanism; industrial cluster; knowledge spillover; one-off gaming; Costs; Game theory; Industrial economics; Industrial relations; Information analysis; Information resources; Power generation economics; Production; Technological innovation; Toy industry;
Conference_Titel :
Management and Service Science, 2009. MASS '09. International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Wuhan
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-4638-4
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-4639-1
DOI :
10.1109/ICMSS.2009.5305509