DocumentCode
2195310
Title
Incentive Effect of Executive Stock Option: Empirical Evidence from Listed Companies of Japan
Author
Li Bin ; Zhang Jun ; Zheng Chenggong
Author_Institution
Japan Studies Inst., Liaoning Univ., Shenyang, China
fYear
2010
fDate
24-26 Aug. 2010
Firstpage
1
Lastpage
4
Abstract
With the occurrence of accounting scandals in Enron Corp, Incentive Effect of Executive Stock Option(ESO) is being questioned more and more. The task of the greatest urgency at present is to ascertain and find out whether ESO provides the administrators a stimulus to improve the corporate performance. This essay carries out a study with the samples from Japanese listed companies and the results show: the company´s share price and performance with the introduction of ESO are significantly higher than those without; the incentive effect of the new and high-tech industries with the introduction of ESO is significantly better than those industries with traditional technology.
Keywords
accounting; incentive schemes; stock markets; Enron Corp; Japanese listed companies; accounting scandals; executive stock option; incentive effect; Biological system modeling; Companies; Manufacturing industries; Share prices;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Management and Service Science (MASS), 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Wuhan
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-5325-2
Electronic_ISBN
978-1-4244-5326-9
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICMSS.2010.5578098
Filename
5578098
Link To Document