• DocumentCode
    2204642
  • Title

    Efficient Auction for Risk Averse Buyers

  • Author

    Dai, Xianhua

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Law & Bus., Wuhan Inst. of Technol., Wuhan, China
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    24-26 Aug. 2010
  • Firstpage
    1
  • Lastpage
    2
  • Abstract
    An ex-post efficient auction is one auction maximizing surplus conditional on all available information. It is well known that, for private values, the Vickrey auctions for risk neutral buyers for one indivisible good are ex-post efficient. In this paper, we model an ex-post efficient auction for risk averse buyers, and exploit that Vickrey auctions for risk averse buyers are still ex-post efficient.
  • Keywords
    commerce; risk management; Vickrey auctions; ex-post efficient auction; risk averse buyers; risk neutral buyers; surplus conditional; Biological system modeling; Cost accounting; Educational institutions; Marketing and sales; Privatization;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Management and Service Science (MASS), 2010 International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Wuhan
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-5325-2
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-1-4244-5326-9
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICMSS.2010.5578476
  • Filename
    5578476
    • Link To Document
    https://search.isc.ac/dl/search/defaultta.aspx?DTC=49&DC=2204642