Title :
Efficient Auction for Risk Averse Buyers
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Law & Bus., Wuhan Inst. of Technol., Wuhan, China
Abstract :
An ex-post efficient auction is one auction maximizing surplus conditional on all available information. It is well known that, for private values, the Vickrey auctions for risk neutral buyers for one indivisible good are ex-post efficient. In this paper, we model an ex-post efficient auction for risk averse buyers, and exploit that Vickrey auctions for risk averse buyers are still ex-post efficient.
Keywords :
commerce; risk management; Vickrey auctions; ex-post efficient auction; risk averse buyers; risk neutral buyers; surplus conditional; Biological system modeling; Cost accounting; Educational institutions; Marketing and sales; Privatization;
Conference_Titel :
Management and Service Science (MASS), 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Wuhan
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-5325-2
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-5326-9
DOI :
10.1109/ICMSS.2010.5578476
