Title :
Study on the Moral Hazard of Developing Tourism Resources in China
Author_Institution :
Manage. Sch., Jinan Univ., Guangzhou, China
Abstract :
Based on information asymmetry, this paper analyzes the moral hazard of developing tourism resources in China by the principal-agent theory. It links tourism revenues to the developing compensation. To solve the moral hazard, this paper designs an incentive and restrictive mechanism. Based on the model, the problems in the development are analyzed, and proposals of improving the mechanism are proposed.
Keywords :
social sciences; travel industry; incentive mechanism; information asymmetry; moral hazard; principal-agent theory; restrictive mechanism; tourism resource development; Companies; Contracts; Ethics; Hazards; Investments; Local government;
Conference_Titel :
Management and Service Science (MASS), 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Wuhan
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-5325-2
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-5326-9
DOI :
10.1109/ICMSS.2010.5578500
