DocumentCode
2205496
Title
An evolutional game analysis on lending behaviors between banks and enterprises
Author
Lu, Lu
Author_Institution
Dept. of Econ., Shanghai Univ., Shanghai, China
fYear
2011
fDate
9-11 Sept. 2011
Firstpage
3075
Lastpage
3078
Abstract
Based on the theory of evolutionary game, this paper using replication dynamic equations to analyze behaviors of banks and enterprises in the process of lending. Though the result of evolutionary game is a disappointment for rational people as the market is close to a failure, the government as an external force can promote a better relationship between banks and enterprises to mutual benefits for both parties.
Keywords
banking; evolutionary computation; game theory; banks; enterprises; evolutionary game analysis; lending behaviors; replication dynamic equations; Economics; Educational institutions; Equations; Finance; Games; Government; Logistics; banks and enterprises; evolutionary game; government;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Electronics, Communications and Control (ICECC), 2011 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Zhejiang
Print_ISBN
978-1-4577-0320-1
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICECC.2011.6068112
Filename
6068112
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