Title :
An Equilibrium Study about Spectrum between "Winner\´s Curse" and Seller\´s Earnings Based on Uniform-Price Auction
Author :
Sun, Jing ; Song, Qizhu ; Lu, Tingjie
Author_Institution :
Beijing Univ. of Posts & Telecommun., Beijing, China
Abstract :
The auction mechanism of spectrum becomes the focus in China with the issuance of 3G license. The uniform-price auctions which aim to reduce the risk of "winner\´s curse" and the protection of seller\´s earnings are proposed to in this paper. A model of seller\´s earnings and the relevant influent factors is established. The equilibrium status which can reduce the risk of "winner\´s curse" and guarantee the seller\´s earnings is also mentioned in this paper.
Keywords :
commerce; 3G license; China; equilibrium status; sellers earning; uniform-price auction mechanism; Cost accounting; FCC; Government; Information science; Licenses; Oil drilling; Protection; Sun;
Conference_Titel :
Information Science and Engineering (ICISE), 2009 1st International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Nanjing
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-4909-5
DOI :
10.1109/ICISE.2009.260
