• DocumentCode
    2208491
  • Title

    An algorithm for automatically designing deterministic mechanisms without payments

  • Author

    Conitzer, V. ; Sandholm, T.

  • Author_Institution
    Carnegie Mellon University
  • fYear
    2004
  • fDate
    23-23 July 2004
  • Firstpage
    128
  • Lastpage
    135
  • Abstract
    Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that a desirable outcome is reached even though the agents in the game behave selfishly. This is a difficult problem because the designer is uncertain about the agents?? preferences and the agents may lie about their preferences. Traditionally, the focus in mechanism design has been on designing mechanisms that are appropriate for a range of settings. While this approach has produced a number of famous mechanisms, much of the space of possible settings is still left uncovered. In contrast, in automated mechanism design (AMD), a mechanism is computed on the fly for the setting at hand??a universally applicable approach.
  • Keywords
    Algorithm design and analysis; Art; Computer science; Costs; Engineering profession; Permission; Probability distribution; Resource management;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2004. AAMAS 2004. Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    New York, NY, USA
  • Print_ISBN
    1-58113-864-4
  • Type

    conf

  • Filename
    1373471