DocumentCode
2208491
Title
An algorithm for automatically designing deterministic mechanisms without payments
Author
Conitzer, V. ; Sandholm, T.
Author_Institution
Carnegie Mellon University
fYear
2004
fDate
23-23 July 2004
Firstpage
128
Lastpage
135
Abstract
Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that a desirable outcome is reached even though the agents in the game behave selfishly. This is a difficult problem because the designer is uncertain about the agents?? preferences and the agents may lie about their preferences. Traditionally, the focus in mechanism design has been on designing mechanisms that are appropriate for a range of settings. While this approach has produced a number of famous mechanisms, much of the space of possible settings is still left uncovered. In contrast, in automated mechanism design (AMD), a mechanism is computed on the fly for the setting at hand??a universally applicable approach.
Keywords
Algorithm design and analysis; Art; Computer science; Costs; Engineering profession; Permission; Probability distribution; Resource management;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2004. AAMAS 2004. Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on
Conference_Location
New York, NY, USA
Print_ISBN
1-58113-864-4
Type
conf
Filename
1373471
Link To Document