• DocumentCode
    2218253
  • Title

    Closed-Loop Supply Chain Game Model with a Common Retailer

  • Author

    Yu-yin, Yi ; Li-jun, Xiao

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Manage., Jinan Univ., Guangzhou, China
  • Volume
    1
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    26-28 Nov. 2010
  • Firstpage
    360
  • Lastpage
    363
  • Abstract
    A closed-loop supply chain(CLSC) consist of two manufacturers and one common retailer with product remanufacturing are modeled by using game theory, in this CLSC, the common retailer is engaged in the collection of used products in addition to distributing new products of two manufacturers. The optimal product return rates, and price competition decision- making are studied under three different market structures, Manufacturer Stackelberg market, Retailer Stackelberg market, and Manufacturer- Retailer Nash market. The results show that the industry as a whole as well as consumer and environment benefit from lower prices, larger return rates and profits when there is no market leadership. However, an individual member has an incentive to play the leader´s role. When consider market leadership only, the environment, industry and consumer prefer the market dominated by retailer.
  • Keywords
    closed loop systems; decision making; game theory; pricing; recycling; retailing; supply chains; CLSC game model; closed-loop supply chain game model; decision making; game theory; manufacturer Stackelberg market; manufacturer-retailer Nash market; optimal product return rate; price competition; product remanufacturing; retailer; retailer Stackelberg market; Closed-loop Supply Chain; Game; Remanufacturing;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Information Management, Innovation Management and Industrial Engineering (ICIII), 2010 International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Kunming
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-8829-2
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICIII.2010.93
  • Filename
    5694422