DocumentCode
2218253
Title
Closed-Loop Supply Chain Game Model with a Common Retailer
Author
Yu-yin, Yi ; Li-jun, Xiao
Author_Institution
Sch. of Manage., Jinan Univ., Guangzhou, China
Volume
1
fYear
2010
fDate
26-28 Nov. 2010
Firstpage
360
Lastpage
363
Abstract
A closed-loop supply chain(CLSC) consist of two manufacturers and one common retailer with product remanufacturing are modeled by using game theory, in this CLSC, the common retailer is engaged in the collection of used products in addition to distributing new products of two manufacturers. The optimal product return rates, and price competition decision- making are studied under three different market structures, Manufacturer Stackelberg market, Retailer Stackelberg market, and Manufacturer- Retailer Nash market. The results show that the industry as a whole as well as consumer and environment benefit from lower prices, larger return rates and profits when there is no market leadership. However, an individual member has an incentive to play the leader´s role. When consider market leadership only, the environment, industry and consumer prefer the market dominated by retailer.
Keywords
closed loop systems; decision making; game theory; pricing; recycling; retailing; supply chains; CLSC game model; closed-loop supply chain game model; decision making; game theory; manufacturer Stackelberg market; manufacturer-retailer Nash market; optimal product return rate; price competition; product remanufacturing; retailer; retailer Stackelberg market; Closed-loop Supply Chain; Game; Remanufacturing;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Information Management, Innovation Management and Industrial Engineering (ICIII), 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Kunming
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-8829-2
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICIII.2010.93
Filename
5694422
Link To Document