• DocumentCode
    2223633
  • Title

    Co-evolutionary bidding strategies for buyers in electricity power markets

  • Author

    Srinivasan, Dipti ; Trung, Ly Trong

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Electr. & Comput. Eng., Nat. Univ. of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
  • fYear
    2011
  • fDate
    5-8 June 2011
  • Firstpage
    2519
  • Lastpage
    2526
  • Abstract
    The deregulation of the electrical power industries has opened many opportunities to power buyers, once price takers of a monopolistic economy, to look forward to a free market economy with market forces determining the market clearing prices and quantities. However, the strong influence of technical and physical constraints of the network may result in economic decisions that adversely affect the interests of the consumers. Compared to the monopolistic economy of yesteryears, power buyers may actually be able to influence the market by cooperating with other power buyers in the network. This paper presents a co-evolutionary algorithm for evolving individual and cooperative strategies of electricity buyers in a power market. The algorithm focuses on how the buyers choose their bidding strategies through learning to maximize the profits in different scenarios of playing individually or cooperatively. The results show that it is of great benefit to cooperate but the free rider problem may arise when an individual buyer gains more profit due to the cooperative effort of the others.
  • Keywords
    evolutionary computation; monopoly; power markets; pricing; profitability; buyers; co-evolutionary bidding strategies; electrical power industries; electricity power markets; market clearing prices; monopolistic economy; profits; Biological cells; Biological system modeling; Electricity; Generators; Nash equilibrium; Power markets; Bidding Strategies; Co-evolutionary Algorithms; Game Theory; Power Markets;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Evolutionary Computation (CEC), 2011 IEEE Congress on
  • Conference_Location
    New Orleans, LA
  • ISSN
    Pending
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-7834-7
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/CEC.2011.5949931
  • Filename
    5949931