DocumentCode :
2223633
Title :
Co-evolutionary bidding strategies for buyers in electricity power markets
Author :
Srinivasan, Dipti ; Trung, Ly Trong
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Electr. & Comput. Eng., Nat. Univ. of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
fYear :
2011
fDate :
5-8 June 2011
Firstpage :
2519
Lastpage :
2526
Abstract :
The deregulation of the electrical power industries has opened many opportunities to power buyers, once price takers of a monopolistic economy, to look forward to a free market economy with market forces determining the market clearing prices and quantities. However, the strong influence of technical and physical constraints of the network may result in economic decisions that adversely affect the interests of the consumers. Compared to the monopolistic economy of yesteryears, power buyers may actually be able to influence the market by cooperating with other power buyers in the network. This paper presents a co-evolutionary algorithm for evolving individual and cooperative strategies of electricity buyers in a power market. The algorithm focuses on how the buyers choose their bidding strategies through learning to maximize the profits in different scenarios of playing individually or cooperatively. The results show that it is of great benefit to cooperate but the free rider problem may arise when an individual buyer gains more profit due to the cooperative effort of the others.
Keywords :
evolutionary computation; monopoly; power markets; pricing; profitability; buyers; co-evolutionary bidding strategies; electrical power industries; electricity power markets; market clearing prices; monopolistic economy; profits; Biological cells; Biological system modeling; Electricity; Generators; Nash equilibrium; Power markets; Bidding Strategies; Co-evolutionary Algorithms; Game Theory; Power Markets;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Evolutionary Computation (CEC), 2011 IEEE Congress on
Conference_Location :
New Orleans, LA
ISSN :
Pending
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-7834-7
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/CEC.2011.5949931
Filename :
5949931
Link To Document :
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