Title :
Non-refundable-bid auctions for positions in a queue: a decision-theoretic analysis
Author :
Winoto, Pinata ; Tang, Tiffany Ya
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Comput. Sci., Univ. of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Sask., Canada
Abstract :
In our previous work, we investigated resource allocations among agents by means of legal/illegal behavior in the context of an M/D/I queuing model. Specifically, self-interested agents are deployed in a non-cooperative game: compete with each other to bid/bribe for quicker service provided by the server. In this paper, we extend our previous work and provide formal notions of more general queuing models, but restrict our discussion in a legal bid queue only. An analysis of their properties from decision theoretic perspective is discussed. We conduct an experiment to observe the advantage of various strategies.
Keywords :
decision theory; multi-agent systems; queueing theory; resource allocation; decision-theoretic analysis; legal bid queue; noncooperative game; nonrefundable-bid auction; queuing model; resource allocation; self-interested agents; software agents; Intelligent agent; Queueing analysis;
Conference_Titel :
Intelligent Agent Technology, 2003. IAT 2003. IEEE/WIC International Conference on
Print_ISBN :
0-7695-1931-8
DOI :
10.1109/IAT.2003.1241144
