DocumentCode :
2238536
Title :
Games of Incomplete Information to Logistics Outsourcing
Author :
Cao Qingkui ; Zhang Xianxin
Author_Institution :
Coll. of Econ. & Manage., Hebei Univ. of Eng., Handan
Volume :
2
fYear :
2008
fDate :
19-19 Dec. 2008
Firstpage :
277
Lastpage :
280
Abstract :
This paper take the background of outsourcing of logistics services, through analyzed the game model of couple under the situation of incomplete information, attempts to set up a game model of incomplete information of the logistics out-souring enterprises and logistics service provider in outsourcing of logistics services, finally, put forward an important conclusion, in the early stages of cooperation, logistics out-souring enterprise pay great attention to supervise, and logistics service provider will not take strategy of violation. However, with the deepening of cooperation, the two sides will understand each other gradually. Trust factor will occupy the dominant position of cooperation. Logistics out-souring enterprise will reduce its power of supervision gradually and logistics service provider will take the strategy of violation because of the trust from the other party. It looks like a paradox, but it reflects a main factor of moral hazard in the logistics outsourcing business - trust. It has a high practical value to the logistics outsourcing business.
Keywords :
business data processing; game theory; logistics; outsourcing; game model; incomplete information; logistics outsouring enterprise; trust factor; Costs; Educational institutions; Engineering management; Ethics; Forward contracts; Hazards; Logistics; Nash equilibrium; Outsourcing; Seminars; Game of couple; Games of incomplete information; Logistics outsourcing; Nash equilibrium of mixed strategies; moral hazard;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Business and Information Management, 2008. ISBIM '08. International Seminar on
Conference_Location :
Wuhan
Print_ISBN :
978-0-7695-3560-9
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/ISBIM.2008.37
Filename :
5116474
Link To Document :
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