Title :
Competitive Bidding in Urban Land Auctions with Incentive Contracts
Author :
Chen, Qianqin ; Fan, Min
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Econ. & Commerce, South China Univ. of Technol., Guangzhou
Abstract :
This paper formulates a game theoretical model of urban land auctions with incentive contracts. The auction is organized by the government seeking to exercise control over house prices. The firm type, a parameter that reflects efficiency of a firm, is private information to all firms, and utility functions of participants take general forms. This paper shows that the Bayesian Nash equilibrium firm bidding strategies are monotonic in firm types.
Keywords :
Bayes methods; commerce; contracts; game theory; Bayesian Nash equilibrium; competitive bidding; firm bidding strategies; game theoretical model; incentive contracts; private information; urban land auctions; utility functions; Bayesian methods; Business; Contracts; Costs; Government; Information management; Investments; Nash equilibrium; Paper technology; Seminars; Bayesian Nash equilibrium; first price sealed bid auction; incentive contracts; private information; revelation principle;
Conference_Titel :
Business and Information Management, 2008. ISBIM '08. International Seminar on
Conference_Location :
Wuhan
Print_ISBN :
978-0-7695-3560-9
DOI :
10.1109/ISBIM.2008.223
