DocumentCode
2239371
Title
Competitive Bidding in Urban Land Auctions with Incentive Contracts
Author
Chen, Qianqin ; Fan, Min
Author_Institution
Sch. of Econ. & Commerce, South China Univ. of Technol., Guangzhou
Volume
2
fYear
2008
fDate
19-19 Dec. 2008
Firstpage
437
Lastpage
440
Abstract
This paper formulates a game theoretical model of urban land auctions with incentive contracts. The auction is organized by the government seeking to exercise control over house prices. The firm type, a parameter that reflects efficiency of a firm, is private information to all firms, and utility functions of participants take general forms. This paper shows that the Bayesian Nash equilibrium firm bidding strategies are monotonic in firm types.
Keywords
Bayes methods; commerce; contracts; game theory; Bayesian Nash equilibrium; competitive bidding; firm bidding strategies; game theoretical model; incentive contracts; private information; urban land auctions; utility functions; Bayesian methods; Business; Contracts; Costs; Government; Information management; Investments; Nash equilibrium; Paper technology; Seminars; Bayesian Nash equilibrium; first price sealed bid auction; incentive contracts; private information; revelation principle;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Business and Information Management, 2008. ISBIM '08. International Seminar on
Conference_Location
Wuhan
Print_ISBN
978-0-7695-3560-9
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ISBIM.2008.223
Filename
5116513
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