DocumentCode
2239781
Title
The Optimal Contract Design in Modular Outsourcing of Complex Product
Author
Peng Ben-hong ; Zong Qi
Author_Institution
Shanghai Univ. of Finance & Econ., Shanghai
Volume
2
fYear
2008
fDate
19-19 Dec. 2008
Firstpage
509
Lastpage
512
Abstract
Moral risk and adverse selection is concomitant in modular outsourcing of complex product. The integrated model involving moral risk and adverse selection is set up, and the optimal solution is analyzed in the paper. The conclusions is drawn that the modular integrator should adopt corresponding strategies to remove opportunism by using impawn mechanism, supervised system, fellowship of choice and advanced collaboration level.
Keywords
contracts; design engineering; manufactured products; outsourcing; supply chains; complex product; modular outsourcing; moral risk; optimal contract design; product manufacturing; Contracts; Ethics; Finance; Information management; Manufacturing industries; Manufacturing processes; Outsourcing; Risk analysis; Seminars; Technological innovation; Complex product; Modular outsourcing; Optimal contract;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Business and Information Management, 2008. ISBIM '08. International Seminar on
Conference_Location
Wuhan
Print_ISBN
978-0-7695-3560-9
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ISBIM.2008.153
Filename
5116530
Link To Document