Title :
Principal-agent model and risk analysis under asymmetric information condition
Author :
Guang-ming, Zhang
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Manage., Guangxi Univ. of Technol., Liuzhou, China
Abstract :
The paper describes a kind of principal-agent model under asymmetric information condition from actual economic life. Through the analysis on optimal solution of the model, we discover that the risk appetite of the agent has a direct effect on the optimal incentive mechanism and the risk sharing of principal and agent, and also endow a parameter in the incentive contract with new economic presentation.
Keywords :
contracts; economics; risk analysis; actual economic life; asymmetric information condition; economic presentation; incentive contract; optimal incentive mechanism; principal-agent model; principal-agent risk sharing; risk analysis; risk appetite; Analytical models; Contracts; Economics; Educational institutions; Random variables; agent; asymmetric information; principal; risk;
Conference_Titel :
Management Science and Engineering (ICMSE), 2011 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Rome
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4577-1885-4
DOI :
10.1109/ICMSE.2011.6069963
