A game analysis of firms´ product safety responsibility basing on the consumer´s preference

Applying the basic idea of game thoery, the essay studies on the consumers´ pulling game for product safety responsibility(PSR) of firms, the requirement and struggling game between consumers and firms about PSR, and the firms´ PSR signaling game. The results show that It is the key to optimize the pareto for firms and consumers that ^b kind of firms fulfil PSR preferably and signal the useful information to the consumers. Because category ^b firms´ expected profit is bigger than that of category ^ω, therefore, even though consumers think category ^b firms is better, it is more likely to become a pressuring target, suffering more corporate social responsibility pressure. When the expected profit coming from the target firms is bigger than the struggling cost needed, both category ^b and ^ω firms would choose to fight. Category^b firms adopt the positive PSR signaling strategies, and they send out the signals which can not imitated by the category^ω firms, this method can not only make the market disassociate in a balanced and satisfactory, and solve the problems of category^ω firms expelling category ^b firms, but also can help the category ^b firms create the fine social images, and increase the future profits.