Title :
Looking for diamonds in the desert - extending automatic protocol generation to three-party authentication and key agreement protocols
Author :
Perrig, Adrian ; Song, Dawn
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Comput. Sci., California Univ., Berkeley, CA, USA
Abstract :
We describe our new results in developing and extending Automatic Protocol Generation (APG), an approach to automatically generate security protocols. We explore two-party mutual authentication and key agreement protocols, with a trusted third party (TTP) which shares a symmetric key with each of the two principals. During the process, we experienced the challenge of a gigantic protocol space. Facing this challenge, we develop more powerful reduction techniques for the protocol generator. We also develop new pruning theorems and probabilistic methods of picking goal orderings for the protocol screener, Athena, which greatly improve the efficiency and worst-case performance of Athena. In our first experiment, APG found new protocols for two-party mutual authentication with a TTP using symmetric keys. In our second experiment, APG also found new protocols for three different sets of security properties for two-party authentication and key agreement. Our new list of security properties for key agreement also uncovered an undocumented deficiency in the Yahalom protocol
Keywords :
cryptography; message authentication; protocols; security of data; Athena; Yahalom protocol; automatic protocol generation; key agreement; key agreement protocols; probabilistic methods; protocol complexity; protocol screener; pruning theorems; reduction techniques; security properties; security protocols; symmetric keys; three-party authentication; trusted third party; two-party mutual authentication; Authentication; Computer science; Computer security; Cost function; Power generation; Process design; Protocols; State estimation; State-space methods; US Government agencies;
Conference_Titel :
Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2000. CSFW-13. Proceedings. 13th IEEE
Conference_Location :
Cambridge
Print_ISBN :
0-7695-0671-2
DOI :
10.1109/CSFW.2000.856926