DocumentCode
2242859
Title
Linear Incentive Contract for Principal-agent Problem with Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard
Author
Shanliang, Li ; Chunhua, Wang
Author_Institution
Sch. of Politics & Public Adm., Soochow Univ., Suzhou
fYear
2006
fDate
4-7 Dec. 2006
Firstpage
634
Lastpage
637
Abstract
The principal-agent theory is applied to solve the problem with asymmetrical information in economics, management and society. Mathematically, the principal-agent problem is a bi-level programming problem which is very difficult to solve. In this paper, we design two kinds of linear incentive contracts consisting of linear screening contract and linear pooling contract to solve the principal-agent problem with asymmetric information and moral hazard
Keywords
contracts; incentive schemes; pricing; asymmetric information; bi-level programming problem; economics; linear incentive contract; linear pooling contract; linear screening contract; management; moral hazard; principal-agent problem; society; Aquaculture; Contracts; Environmental economics; Ethics; Hazards; Incentive schemes; Information analysis; Information management; Linear programming; Remuneration; Principal-agent theory; asymmetric information; incentive contracts; moral hazard;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Circuits and Systems, 2006. APCCAS 2006. IEEE Asia Pacific Conference on
Conference_Location
Singapore
Print_ISBN
1-4244-0387-1
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/APCCAS.2006.342068
Filename
4145473
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