Title :
Linear Incentive Contract for Principal-agent Problem with Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard
Author :
Shanliang, Li ; Chunhua, Wang
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Politics & Public Adm., Soochow Univ., Suzhou
Abstract :
The principal-agent theory is applied to solve the problem with asymmetrical information in economics, management and society. Mathematically, the principal-agent problem is a bi-level programming problem which is very difficult to solve. In this paper, we design two kinds of linear incentive contracts consisting of linear screening contract and linear pooling contract to solve the principal-agent problem with asymmetric information and moral hazard
Keywords :
contracts; incentive schemes; pricing; asymmetric information; bi-level programming problem; economics; linear incentive contract; linear pooling contract; linear screening contract; management; moral hazard; principal-agent problem; society; Aquaculture; Contracts; Environmental economics; Ethics; Hazards; Incentive schemes; Information analysis; Information management; Linear programming; Remuneration; Principal-agent theory; asymmetric information; incentive contracts; moral hazard;
Conference_Titel :
Circuits and Systems, 2006. APCCAS 2006. IEEE Asia Pacific Conference on
Conference_Location :
Singapore
Print_ISBN :
1-4244-0387-1
DOI :
10.1109/APCCAS.2006.342068
