Firm Location Choice with Technological Diffusion

Author

Chen, Qianqin ; Fan, Min

Author_Institution

Sch. of Econ. & Commerce, South China Univ. of Technol., Guangzhou

Volume

1

fYear

2008

fDate

19-19 Dec. 2008

Firstpage

412

Lastpage

415

Abstract

This paper formulates a three-stage cournot duopoly model on a circular city to investigate firm location choice and firm R&D strategic interaction. Both firms choose locations, make R&D decisions and compete a la cournot. In the presence of spillovers and complementarities of technology innovation, this paper derives two subgame perfect Nash equilibria: a strictly dispersed equilibrium without firm R&D activities and a strictly agglomerated equilibrium with R&D activities by both firms.

Keywords

facility location; game theory; research and development; strategic planning; agglomerated equilibrium; circular city; firm R&D strategic interaction; firm location choice; subgame perfect Nash equilibria; technological diffusion; three-stage cournot duopoly model; Business; Cities and towns; Costs; Electronic mail; Information management; Nash equilibrium; Paper technology; Research and development; Seminars; Technological innovation; complementarities; cournot duopoly model; location choice; spillovers; subgame perfect Nash equilibrium;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Business and Information Management, 2008. ISBIM '08. International Seminar on

Conference_Location

Wuhan

Print_ISBN

978-0-7695-3560-9

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/ISBIM.2008.222

Filename

5117515