• DocumentCode
    2266064
  • Title

    An Equilibrium-Based Approach for Determining Winners in Combinatorial Auctions

  • Author

    Tsung, ChenKun ; Ho, HannJang ; Lee, SingLing

  • Author_Institution
    Comput. Sci. & Inf. Eng., Nat. Chung Cheng Univ., Chiayi, Taiwan
  • fYear
    2011
  • fDate
    26-28 May 2011
  • Firstpage
    47
  • Lastpage
    51
  • Abstract
    Determining winners in combinatorial auctions is an NP-complete problem. Based on the idea of searching Nash Equilibria (NE), this paper presents a local search procedure to determine winners. To improve the solution quality calculated by the local search, we propose Nash Equilibrium Search Approach (NESA) to probe various NE solutions. According to the simulation results, auctioneer´s revenue in NESA is at least 1.08% and 9.10% more than that in a general GA and Casanova, respectively. A stable solution based on NESA will be obtained within 400 seconds. Moreover, simulation results show that the solution quality of NESA is near-optimal.
  • Keywords
    combinatorial mathematics; commerce; game theory; optimisation; search problems; NESA; NP-complete problem; Nash equilibrium search approach; combinatorial auction; equilibrium-based approach; local search procedure; winner determination problem; Approximation algorithms; Computational modeling; Convergence; Economic indicators; Nash equilibrium; Optimized production technology; Simulation; NP-complete problem; Nash Equilibrium; combinatorial auction; local search procedure; winner determination problem;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Parallel and Distributed Processing with Applications (ISPA), 2011 IEEE 9th International Symposium on
  • Conference_Location
    Busan
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4577-0391-1
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-0-7695-4428-1
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ISPA.2011.13
  • Filename
    5951881