DocumentCode
2266225
Title
On the value of a well chosen bit to the seller in an auction
Author
Hajek, Bruce
Author_Institution
Dept. of Electr. & Comput. Eng., Illinois Univ., Urbana, IL
fYear
2005
fDate
4-9 Sept. 2005
Firstpage
293
Lastpage
296
Abstract
A central fact in the theory of optimal auction design is that the seller of a single object in an auction with n bidders, having independent, random valuations, typically cannot extract the full maximum value of the object from the buyers. We show that if the seller has access to a single bit of information, even if noisy, then the seller can extract full value. The work is meant to explore the use of information measures in mechanism design problems
Keywords
commerce; game theory; information theory; full maximum value; information measures; optimal auction design; Books; Context; Cost accounting; Data mining; Game theory; Linear programming; Marketing and sales; Painting; Probability distribution;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Information Theory, 2005. ISIT 2005. Proceedings. International Symposium on
Conference_Location
Adelaide, SA
Print_ISBN
0-7803-9151-9
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ISIT.2005.1523341
Filename
1523341
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