Truthful online auctions for pricing peer-to-peer services

Author

Chen, Po-An ; Chuang, Tyng-Ruey

Author_Institution

Inst. of Inf. Sci., Acad. Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan

fYear

2005

fDate

19-22 July 2005

Firstpage

59

Lastpage

66

Abstract

We consider truthful online auctions that aim at optimizing sellers\´ revenues, representing service contributors\´ satisfactions, as a general model for pricing peer-to-peer services under the assumption of individual service consumer\´s rationality. For services that are in unlimited supply, we design a randomized truthful online auction with guaranteed revenue based on a randomized truthful offline auction. It is shown that the expected revenue extracted by our truthful online auction over all random factors achieves a Θ (1) approximation ratio relative to the optimal single-price revenue under some reasonable assumption about the input bids. Since a peer must serve others to earn sufficient revenue that can cover its payment for being served, we argue that our online truthful auctions can be suitable schemes for incentivizing peer nodes in peer-to-peer systems to share, and thereby addressing the "free-rider" problem in peer-to-peer service sharing.

Keywords

Internet; electronic commerce; marketing; peer-to-peer computing; pricing; free-rider problem; peer-to-peer services; randomized truthful offline auction; truthful online auctions; Admission control; Algorithm design and analysis; Cost accounting; Distributed computing; Information science; Microeconomics; Motion pictures; Peer to peer computing; Pricing; Streaming media;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

E-Commerce Technology, 2005. CEC 2005. Seventh IEEE International Conference on

Print_ISBN

0-7695-2277-7

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/ICECT.2005.100

Filename

1524029