• DocumentCode
    2287986
  • Title

    A game analysis on reputation governance mechanism of trade behaviors in industrial cluster

  • Author

    Liu, Qin

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Manage., Univ. of Shanghai for Sci. & Technol., Shanghai, China
  • fYear
    2009
  • fDate
    14-16 Sept. 2009
  • Firstpage
    1664
  • Lastpage
    1670
  • Abstract
    The industrial cluster shows its particular competition advantages, so the world forming many clusters under the globalization. Competition and cooperation will enhance the enterprises´ competition in cluster. Due to all kinds of reasons, the members in industrial cluster may produce opportunism behavior to seize the behalf of the trade companion. So we can see some enterprise contracted based on common demands. In bargaining process, because some members over-consider of self-profits and be afraid of others´ opportunism action, they will deviate to contracts, which will result in un-stability and failure. Reputation governance mechanism can save trade cost, promote cooperation. By modified the KMRW model, the paper draws the conclusion that under the network of cluster, reputation governance mechanism is important in industrial cluster to governance the opportunism behavior. That is the members should pay much attention to keep good reputation. Reputation governance mechanism is one of the important governance mechanism of industrial cluster.
  • Keywords
    game theory; industrial economics; bargaining process; game analysis; industrial cluster; opportunism behavior; reputation governance mechanism; trade behaviors; Conference management; Contracts; Costs; Engineering management; Finance; Game theory; Globalization; Information theory; Technology management; Toy industry; game; governance; industrial cluster; reputation; trade behavior;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Management Science and Engineering, 2009. ICMSE 2009. International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Moscow
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-3970-6
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-1-4244-3971-3
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICMSE.2009.5317841
  • Filename
    5317841