Study on the distribution in residual control right of accounting standards

Accounting standards is a kind of incomplete contract and its residual control right belongs to enterprises´ stakeholders. Stakeholders participating in accounting policy choice (SPAPC) is a method of distribution in residual control right of accounting standards. The strategy choice among stakeholders is a process of repeated game. Stakeholders choose strategy on the basis of the present value of their benefit in the game and they may adjust the strategy according to others´ choice. The strategy change speed is related to rate of stakeholders choosing the strategy initially. The state of Nash equilibrium means that all stakeholders can choose the accounting policy which can reflect enterprises´ income status factually. In the process of SPAPC, stakeholders constrain with each other, which can avoid inefficiency of accounting policy choice and earnings manipulation of management. It´s helpful to solve the matching problem between residual control right and residual claim right and decrease institution change cost of accounting standards.