Ultimate controller, corporate government and consideration determination in the Split-share Structure Reform

Based on 1125 firms of Split-share Structure Reform on June 30, 2008, the relationship between corporate governance and consideration ratio is examined with ordinary multiple regression methods from micro aspects of corporate government structure. Empirical results show that the company´s ownership structure and the consideration have a significantly linear relationship. When a listed company´s ultimate controller is state-owned, the floating shareholders get higher consideration. When the firm´s ultimate controller is non-state-owned, the tradable shareholders receive less consideration. In addition, the greater the Z index (the deviation between the first and the second shareholders), the higher the consideration. The ratio of shares of top ten shareholders and the consideration have a positive relationship but not significantly. EPS and consideration have a negative correlation. Different commitment variables have different impact on consideration. Whether the corporation issues B or H shares, the size of board of directors and independent directors do not express an obvious correlation.