Operator competition with asymmetric strategies in shared spectrum

As the regulation in wireless communications is moving toward a more flexible and efficient way of managing radio spectrum, it is envisaged that multiple small-sized cellular networks owned by different operators, e.g., facility owners or local operators, will operate in close vicinity on shared spectrum. In this environment, the networks may compete for their own utilities in a selfish manner with giving harmful internetwork interference to competitors. In practice, it is not so unusual that each operator has different fairness criteria or quality of service (QoS) strategies by employing distinct objective functions from competitors. Particularly, we in this paper study power control competition between two networks with the sum of rates (SR) and the minimum rate (MR) as their objective functions, respectively. By exploring Nash equilibria, we identify that the MR network benefits from the objective asymmetry thanks to the adaptability of its competitor, i.e., no constraint in the SR objective. On the other hand, the SR network takes disadvantage due to the fairness requirement reflected in the MR objective of its competitor. However, such asymmetry effects in competition becomes negligible with marginal network separation, e.g., indoor deployment in adjacent buildings. Additionally, we identify cooperation potential with the proper choice of a common objective function although the asymmetric objectives are difficult to be aligned.