Arrears: A Hawk-Dove game theory between public service enterprises and users

Author

Bi, ChenFei ; Li, Jian

Author_Institution

Acad. of Econ., Harbin Univ. of Commerce, Harbin, China

Volume

3

fYear

2010

fDate

9-10 Jan. 2010

Firstpage

1730

Lastpage

1732

Abstract

The arrears issue in public service enterprises becomes the current focus of attention of our society. This paper proposed unreasonable regulatory mechanism is one of the most important causes of arrears. A Hawk-Dove game theory is applied here in order to produce a comprehensive analytic framework for solving such problem. Based on this theory, the paper analyzes the ESS for public service enterprises and users will be live and let-live. Several commendations for incentive compatibility are given accordingly: on one hand, call attention to the users frequently; on the other hand, install new anti-arrears equipments to make a record of the users and punish intentional arrears.

Keywords

financial management; game theory; service industries; Hawk-Dove game theory; anti-arrears equipment; arrears issue; incentive compatibility; intentional arrears; public service enterprises; public service users; unreasonable regulatory mechanism; Contracts; Electronic switching systems; Game theory; Government; Microeconomics; Production; Public finance; Resistance heating; Telecommunications; Water heating; Arrears; ESS; Hawk-Dove game; Incentive Compatibility;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Logistics Systems and Intelligent Management, 2010 International Conference on

Conference_Location

Harbin

Print_ISBN

978-1-4244-7331-1

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/ICLSIM.2010.5461286

Filename

5461286