• DocumentCode
    2321116
  • Title

    Study on the long-term reward incentive of the agent enterprise based on the reputation effect

  • Author

    Gongxiang, Li ; Yilin, Yin

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Manage., Tianjin Univ., Tianjin, China
  • Volume
    3
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    9-10 Jan. 2010
  • Firstpage
    1770
  • Lastpage
    1773
  • Abstract
    For the government investment project, there is a long-term cooperation between the government principal and the agent enterprise. The incentive model of reputation effect of the agent enterprise was built to solve the long-term reward incentive of the agent enterprise under long-term game. The effort degree of the agent enterprise was analyzed with the influence of the reputation effect, and incentive methods of government principal were discussed based on the reputation effect under the cases of symmetry and asymmetric information. The results show that the reputation effect is conducive to encourage the agent enterprise to work harder and the government principal could achieve the long-term incentive effect by adjusting the incentive structure and increasing the reputation incentive.
  • Keywords
    game theory; incentive schemes; investment; project management; public finance; agent enterprise; asymmetric information; government investment project; government principal; incentive structure; long-term game; long-term reward incentive; reputation effect; reputation incentive; Contracts; Councils; Ethics; Government; Hazards; Information analysis; Investments; Project management; Stability; Technology management; Agent Construction System; Government Investment Project; Project Management; Reputation Effect; Reward Incentive;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Logistics Systems and Intelligent Management, 2010 International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Harbin
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-7331-1
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICLSIM.2010.5461305
  • Filename
    5461305