DocumentCode
2321116
Title
Study on the long-term reward incentive of the agent enterprise based on the reputation effect
Author
Gongxiang, Li ; Yilin, Yin
Author_Institution
Sch. of Manage., Tianjin Univ., Tianjin, China
Volume
3
fYear
2010
fDate
9-10 Jan. 2010
Firstpage
1770
Lastpage
1773
Abstract
For the government investment project, there is a long-term cooperation between the government principal and the agent enterprise. The incentive model of reputation effect of the agent enterprise was built to solve the long-term reward incentive of the agent enterprise under long-term game. The effort degree of the agent enterprise was analyzed with the influence of the reputation effect, and incentive methods of government principal were discussed based on the reputation effect under the cases of symmetry and asymmetric information. The results show that the reputation effect is conducive to encourage the agent enterprise to work harder and the government principal could achieve the long-term incentive effect by adjusting the incentive structure and increasing the reputation incentive.
Keywords
game theory; incentive schemes; investment; project management; public finance; agent enterprise; asymmetric information; government investment project; government principal; incentive structure; long-term game; long-term reward incentive; reputation effect; reputation incentive; Contracts; Councils; Ethics; Government; Hazards; Information analysis; Investments; Project management; Stability; Technology management; Agent Construction System; Government Investment Project; Project Management; Reputation Effect; Reward Incentive;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Logistics Systems and Intelligent Management, 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Harbin
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-7331-1
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICLSIM.2010.5461305
Filename
5461305
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