• DocumentCode
    2323003
  • Title

    Using Algebraic Signatures for Remote Data Possession Checking

  • Author

    Chen, Lanxiang

  • Author_Institution
    Key Lab. of Network Security & Cryptology, Fujian Normal Univ., Fuzhou, China
  • fYear
    2011
  • fDate
    10-12 Oct. 2011
  • Firstpage
    289
  • Lastpage
    294
  • Abstract
    Outsourcing storage enables users to access their data anywhere and at any time. It also can comply with a growing number of regulations. However, because of security and reliability, outsourcing storage is not widely adopted. When users store their data in outsourced storage server, they mostly concern about whether the data is intact. This is the goal of remote data possession checking (RDPC) schemes. This paper proposes an algebraic signature based RDPC scheme. Algebraic signature can improve efficiency and the running of algebraic signature can achieve tens to hundreds of megabytes per second. It allows verification without the need for the challenger to compare against the original data. The challenge/response protocol transmits a small, constant amount of data. The user needs to store only two secret keys and several random numbers. The algebraic property of algebraic signatures makes it possible to propose an efficient challenge updating method. Finally, experiment results reveal that the performance is bounded by disk I/O and not by algebraic signature and cryptographic computation.
  • Keywords
    formal verification; security of data; storage management; RDPC scheme; algebraic signature; challenge-response protocol; outsourcing storage; remote data possession checking; Encryption; Error correction codes; Galois fields; Protocols; Servers; Storage security; algebraic signature; proof of retrievability; provable data possession; remote data possession checking;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Cyber-Enabled Distributed Computing and Knowledge Discovery (CyberC), 2011 International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Beijing
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4577-1827-4
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/CyberC.2011.56
  • Filename
    6079445