DocumentCode
232463
Title
Contract Design of Reverse Supply Chain under uncertainty for the quality of the waste materials
Author
Xiong Weiqing ; Wei Ping ; Wu Xiaoxi
Author_Institution
Sch. of Bus., Ningbo Univ., Ningbo, China
fYear
2014
fDate
28-30 July 2014
Firstpage
6330
Lastpage
6333
Abstract
Contracts are designed under uncertainty for the quality of the waste materials. Design separating equilibrium model pooling equilibrium model and quasi-separating equilibrium model under incomplete information. Manufacturer is unable to distinguish recycler and should improve the cost of “lie” in pooling equilibrium in pooling equilibrium.
Keywords
contracts; industrial waste; recycling; supply chain management; contract design; pooling equilibrium model; quasiseparating equilibrium model; recycler; reverse supply chain; separating equilibrium model; uncertainty; waste material quality; Contracts; Educational institutions; Electronic mail; Supply chains; Uncertainty; Waste materials; Contract Design; Information Asymmetry; Reverse Supply Chain; Screening Model;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Control Conference (CCC), 2014 33rd Chinese
Conference_Location
Nanjing
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ChiCC.2014.6896030
Filename
6896030
Link To Document