Honest ideals on strand spaces

Author

Fábrega, F. Javier Thayer ; Herzog, Jonathan C. ; Guttman, Joshua D.

Author_Institution

Mitre Corp., USA

fYear

1998

fDate

9-11 Jun 1998

Firstpage

66

Lastpage

77

Abstract

In security protocol analysis, it is important to learn general principles that limit the abilities of an attacker and that can be applied repeatedly to a variety of protocols. The authors introduce the notion of an ideal-a set of messages closed under encryption and invariant under composition with arbitrary messages-to express such principles. In conjunction with the strand space formalism, they use the concept of ideals to prove bounds on a penetrator´s capabilities, independent of the security protocol being analyzed. From this they prove a number of correctness properties of the Otway Rees protocol, using these results to explain the limitations of the protocol

Keywords

cryptography; protocols; Otway Rees protocol; arbitrary messages; correctness properties; encryption; honest ideals; messages; penetrator capability bounds; security protocol analysis; strand spaces; Algebra; Authentication; Contracts; Cryptographic protocols; Cryptography; National security; Tellurium; Terminology;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 1998. Proceedings. 11th IEEE

Conference_Location

Rockport, MA

ISSN

1063-6900

Print_ISBN

0-8186-8488-7

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/CSFW.1998.683156

Filename

683156