DocumentCode :
235006
Title :
An Improved Side-Channel Attack Based on Support Vector Machine
Author :
Zhong Zeng ; Dawu Gu ; Junrong Liu ; Zheng Guo
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Comput. Sci. & Eng., Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ., Shanghai, China
fYear :
2014
fDate :
15-16 Nov. 2014
Firstpage :
676
Lastpage :
680
Abstract :
Side-channel attack (SCA) is a very efficient cryptanalysis technology to attack cryptographic devices. It takes advantage of physical information leakages to recover the cryptographic key. In order to strengthen the power to extract the cryptographic key-relevant information, this article introduces the Support Vector Machine technologies. Taking a software implementation of masked AES-256 on an Atmel ATMega-163 smart card, we applied an improved profiled side-channel attack to recover the cryptographic key. The current best result of our attack is able to recover the first 128 bits key using only one power trace.
Keywords :
cryptography; support vector machines; Atmel ATMega-163 smart card; SCA; attack cryptographic devices; cryptanalysis technology; cryptographic key-relevant information; masked AES-256; side-channel attack; support vector machine technologies; Computational modeling; Computer science; Correlation; Cryptography; Hamming weight; Support vector machines; Training; AES-256; SCA; Support Vector Machine; information leakage; masking; profiled side-channel attack;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Computational Intelligence and Security (CIS), 2014 Tenth International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Kunming
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4799-7433-7
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/CIS.2014.80
Filename :
7016982
Link To Document :
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