Power control for wireless data based on utility and pricing

We develop a framework for power control for wireless data services based on economic concepts of utility and pricing. Our approach is based on a model for the level of satisfaction (utility) a wireless data user derives from using the system. Using this model, we present a distributed power control scheme that maximizes the utility of each user. Formulating this algorithm as a non-cooperative game, we show conditions for the feasibility of such power control as well as the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium achieved by the non-cooperative game. However, the resulting equilibrium is shown to be Pareto inefficient. A detailed analysis of this equilibrium provides motivation for introducing pricing in the system. A distributed power control scheme is then proposed where users maximize the difference in their utility and price. It is shown by way of simulation that by introducing pricing in the power control algorithm, there is a Pareto improvement in terms of the utilities that the users obtain. Numerical results are presented for the special case of a code division multiple access (CDMA) system for PCS (personal communication services) band