DocumentCode
2402682
Title
The Model Analysis of HR Outsourcing Gambling
Author
Dai, Wei-Dong ; Du, Sha-Sha
Author_Institution
Sch. of Manage., Shenyang Univ. of Technol. Shenyang, Shenyang, China
fYear
2010
fDate
7-9 May 2010
Firstpage
1045
Lastpage
1048
Abstract
The information involved in the process of HR outsourcing is non-symmetrical, it is a certain degree of difficulty that Outsourcing Supplier achieves to maximize the interest in the process of cooperation. Based on principal - agent relationship and in view of outsourcing supplier no understanding the effort level of outsourcing service vendor, setting up the non-continuous effort level outsourcing game model monitored and the continuous effort level outsourcing game model that cannot be monitored. Having done analysis for strategy of cooperation in the light of principal-agent theory framework, Nash Equilibrium thought as well as maximization theory.
Keywords
artificial intelligence; game theory; outsourcing; HR outsourcing gambling; Nash equilibrium; outsourcing service vendor; outsourcing supplier; principal agent relationship; Biological system modeling; Economics; Humans; Monitoring; Nash equilibrium; Outsourcing; Resource management; HR Outsourcing; Nash Equilibrium; Outsourcing Service Vendor; Outsourcing Supplier;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
E-Business and E-Government (ICEE), 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Guangzhou
Print_ISBN
978-0-7695-3997-3
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICEE.2010.270
Filename
5590984
Link To Document