• DocumentCode
    2402682
  • Title

    The Model Analysis of HR Outsourcing Gambling

  • Author

    Dai, Wei-Dong ; Du, Sha-Sha

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Manage., Shenyang Univ. of Technol. Shenyang, Shenyang, China
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    7-9 May 2010
  • Firstpage
    1045
  • Lastpage
    1048
  • Abstract
    The information involved in the process of HR outsourcing is non-symmetrical, it is a certain degree of difficulty that Outsourcing Supplier achieves to maximize the interest in the process of cooperation. Based on principal - agent relationship and in view of outsourcing supplier no understanding the effort level of outsourcing service vendor, setting up the non-continuous effort level outsourcing game model monitored and the continuous effort level outsourcing game model that cannot be monitored. Having done analysis for strategy of cooperation in the light of principal-agent theory framework, Nash Equilibrium thought as well as maximization theory.
  • Keywords
    artificial intelligence; game theory; outsourcing; HR outsourcing gambling; Nash equilibrium; outsourcing service vendor; outsourcing supplier; principal agent relationship; Biological system modeling; Economics; Humans; Monitoring; Nash equilibrium; Outsourcing; Resource management; HR Outsourcing; Nash Equilibrium; Outsourcing Service Vendor; Outsourcing Supplier;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    E-Business and E-Government (ICEE), 2010 International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Guangzhou
  • Print_ISBN
    978-0-7695-3997-3
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICEE.2010.270
  • Filename
    5590984