• DocumentCode
    2408162
  • Title

    Game analysis of environment supervision

  • Author

    Liu, Jian-Jun

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Comput., Dezhou Univ., Dezhou, China
  • fYear
    2009
  • fDate
    15-16 May 2009
  • Firstpage
    166
  • Lastpage
    168
  • Abstract
    This paper establishes a complete information dynamic game model about environment supervision, analyzes this model based on rigorous economy and mathematical logic, and draws the following conclusion: if the surveillance efficiency of government is higher, the prestige is higher, and the government punishes guilty enterprises more seriously, the probability that an enterprise disobeys environmental protection laws and regulations will be smaller, and the environment supervision function of the government will be stronger. In view of the above conclusion, this paper proposes a series of reasonable suggestions to improve environmental status of our country as follows: The government must establish a set of effective supervisory mechanism, arouse the people´s enthusiasm, strengthen environment supervision, and enhance its prestige. The government must punish enterprises more seriously financially and judicially and further strengthen policies on environment economy.
  • Keywords
    economic indicators; formal logic; game theory; government; law; probability; surveillance; enterprise punishment; environment supervision; environmental protection law regulation; governments surveillance efficiency; information dynamic game model; mathematical logic; probability; rigorous economy; Computer industry; Costs; Government; Information analysis; Logic; Mathematical model; Pollution; Production equipment; Surveillance; Water resources; ecological compensation; environment supervision; equilibrium; expected profit; game;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Industrial Mechatronics and Automation, 2009. ICIMA 2009. International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Chengdu
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-3817-4
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICIMA.2009.5156586
  • Filename
    5156586