DocumentCode
2409639
Title
A Value for Weighted Two-level Coalition Structure
Author
Chen, Jianfeng ; Zhang, Xingzhou
Author_Institution
Inst. of Syst. Eng., Dalian Univ. of Technol., Dalian, China
fYear
2010
fDate
7-9 May 2010
Firstpage
3339
Lastpage
3342
Abstract
This paper generalizes the Shapley Value to a non-symmetric value for transferable utility games with two level coalition structure. Non-symmetry exists in players and in both two-level coalition structures. We present seven axioms to characterize this value and provide a property which show that our result consistent with Levy and McLean´s weighted coalition structure value and E. Kalai and D. Sament´s weighted Shapley value.
Keywords
game theory; Shapley value; nonsymmetric value; transferable utility game; weighted two-level coalition structure; Biological system modeling; Economics; Game theory; Games; Magnetic resonance imaging; Presses; Resource management; Shapley value; consistency; two-level coalition structure; weight;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
E-Business and E-Government (ICEE), 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Guangzhou
Print_ISBN
978-0-7695-3997-3
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICEE.2010.839
Filename
5591348
Link To Document