Notice of RetractionStudy on the Incentive of Engineering Contractor under Information Asymmetry

Notice of Retraction

After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.

We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.

The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.

In the field of construction, asymmetry information between owners and contractors leads to a non-cooperative relationship between them for contractors reaping their own economic profits at the expense of owners, nothing but the reasonable and effective incentive mechanism to the contractor can establish a basis on which their partnership and jointly promote success of a project. This paper built an incentive model for contractors as incentive factors of construction cost and period based on the Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) contract by applying the principal-agent theory under the information asymmetry, then, an example was simulated by using Lingo software, two incentive coefficients were calculated, at last, which factors would affect those two incentive coefficients and their influencing trends were obtained through analysis of multiple sets of experimental data, and the incentive effect of this incentive model was proved effective.